We use …eld and natural experiments in online auctions to study the revenue e¤ect of varying the level and disclosure of shipping charges. Our main …ndings are: (1) disclosure a¤ects revenues-for low shipping charges, a seller is better o¤ disclosing; and (2) increasing shipping charges boosts revenues when these charges are hidden.
Introduction
Online stores often reveal shipping charges only after a consumer …lls her "shopping cart." Television o¤ers for items "not sold in stores"disclose shipping and handling in small print with speedy voice-overs. Airlines increasingly use hidden fuel surcharges. Hidden mandatory telephone and energy fees in hotels have triggered class-action lawsuits. 1 Are these practices pro…table? Firms will enjoy higher revenues if consumers naïvely underestimate "shrouded" charges. However, if hidden fees make consumers suspicious, demand may fall. If consumers fully anticipate the charges, shrouding will have no e¤ect. We conduct …eld experiments using leading online auction platforms in Taiwan and Ireland to compare revenues for identical items while varying the level and disclosure of the shipping charge. We also compare revenues before and after a change on eBay's US site that allowed users to display shipping charges in their search results. Our main …ndings are: (1) shrouding a¤ects revenues-for low shipping charges, a seller is better o¤ disclosing; and (2) increasing shipping charges boost revenues when shipping charges are shrouded. Changes in the number of bidders do not appear to drive these revenue di¤erences.
The literature makes a distinction between shrouded charges that are unavoidable (surcharges) and avoidable (add-ons). Shrouding a surcharge is not optimal when all consumers are fully rational and disclosure is costless (Milgrom, 1981; Jovanovic, 1982) . However, shrouding may be optimal with boundedly rational consumers (Spiegler, 2006) . Add-ons may be shrouded in equilibrium when consumers are myopic (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Miao, 2006) , lack self-control (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004), or vary in their tastes for the add-on (Ellison, 2005) . Moreover, there is no incentive for …rms to educate consumers about competitors'shrouded add-ons (Gabaix and Laibson). Ellison and Ellison (2007) …nd that shrouding add-ons is a pro…table strategy for online …rms selling computer memory chips. In …eld experiments, Chetty et al. (2008) …nd that consumer demand falls when retailers post tax-inclusive prices (i.e. disclose a surcharge) for personal care products. They o¤er similar results for tax disclosure in alcohol prices using historical data. Ellison (2006) surveys various approaches to modeling bounded rationality and their implications for …rm pricing. DellaVigna (2008) provides an overview of bounded rationality models using …eld data.
Theory suggests that …rms can exploit price partitioning (separating price into components) to a¤ect consumer choice (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985) . Hossain and Morgan (2006) …nd evidence of this in …eld experiments on eBay's US auction site. They …nd that, when shipping is shrouded, raising the shipping charge increases both revenues and the number of bidders attracted to an auction. In contrast, mixed results have been obtained in laboratory experiments (Morwitz et al., 1998; Bertini and Wathieu, 2008) . Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) …nd that online book retailers do not bene…t from price partitioning. Our paper complements these earlier work by studying the interaction between price partitioning and disclosure using both …eld and natural experiments.
Field Experiments
We conducted …eld experiments, selling 10 di¤erent types of iPods, to study the revenue e¤ect of changing the level and disclosure of shipping charges. The auction title and item description speci…ed the capacity, model, and color of each iPod. The item description clearly stated the shipping charge and method. We disclosed the shipping charge in the title of the listing for half of the auctions and shrouded (omitted) it from the title for the other half.
We used two di¤erent auction sites for these experiments, selling 36 items on Yahoo Taiwan in 2006 and 40 items on eBay Ireland in 2008. Our seller identity on each site had a reasonable reputation rating. The choice of auction sites and products allows us to easily vary shipping and shrouding while selling identical items. IPod markets on these sites are thick, and exhibit considerable variation in shipping charges. Neither site automatically reveals shipping in search listings, an essential feature for examining shrouding. 2 As a result, we could conduct experiments without drawing attention to ourselves.
Taiwan
We sold new 512 MB and 1GB silver iPod Shu-es as well as 1GB and 2GB Nanos in both white and black-a total of six di¤erent iPod models. Our treatments were: To examine the e¤ect of shrouding, we compare treatments Dx to Sx. Comparing treatments xL to xH reveals the e¤ect of raising the shipping charge while holding the opening price …xed. In comparing treatments xL to xH, there is a potential confound-the reserve price (minimum payment) of the auction also increases. This is unlikely to matter since the minimum payment is considerably below the retail price, and not likely to be binding. 3 Nevertheless, the xR treatments ("R" is a mnemonic for reserve) disentangle shipping charges and reserve price. To study the e¤ects of raising the shipping charge while holding the reserve constant, we compare treatments xL to xR. Comparing treatments xR to xH identi…es the e¤ect of raising the opening price with a …xed shipping charge.
Ireland
We sold new 1GB second generation of iPod Shu-es in four di¤erent colors: blue, green, pink and silver. Since changing the reserve price had no e¤ect in the Taiwan experiments, we simpli…ed the design, omitting the xR treatments. Our treatments were: Table 2 also presents permutation based con…dence intervals. 4 The e¤ects of shrouding on revenues may be seen by comparing by comparing each item under treatment Dx with its pair under treatment Sx: 5 Notice that, under low shipping, revenues declined with shrouding. Statistical tests indicate that this revenue di¤erence is signi…cant at the 5% level. Under high shipping, the e¤ect is ambiguous-disclosure increased revenues in Taiwan but reduced them in Ireland. Formal statistical tests do not indicate a signi…cant di¤erence in revenues-con…dence bounds suggest revenue di¤erences do not exceed EUR 2.95. Disclosing a low shipping charge might raise revenues by attracting more bidders, yet there is little evidence of this. Disclosure increased the number of bidders in Taiwan but reduced them in Ireland. Statistical tests suggest that revenue di¤erences cannot be attributed to changes in the number of bidders. Similarly, disclosure has no signi…cant e¤ect on the number of bidders under high shipping.
How do shipping charges a¤ect revenues under the di¤erent shrouding treatments? This may be seen by comparing each item under treatment xL with its pair under treatment xH. When shipping charges are disclosed, the revenue e¤ect is ambiguous-more expensive shipping raises revenues increase in Taiwan but lowers them in Ireland. Once again, formal statistical tests fail to reject the hypothesis of no treatment e¤ect-con…dence bounds indicate the e¤ect is somewhere below EUR 2.16. In contrast, raising the shipping charge signi…cantly increases revenues when shrouded-the winning bidder pays, on average, 5% more in Taiwan and 7% more in Ireland under high shipping. As Table 2 shows, this revenue di¤erence is signi…cant at about the 1% level.
Shipping charges have only modest e¤ects on the number of bidders attracted to each auction. In Taiwan, higher shipping charges attract slightly fewer bidders. In Ireland, they attract slightly more. Statistical tests are consistent with this observation-we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no treatment e¤ect at conventional levels either under disclosure or shrouding.
Holding opening price …xed, raising the shipping charge increases the reserve level of the auction. Comparing treatments xH to xR isolates a pure reserve e¤ect. Regardless of disclosure, there is no statistical di¤erence between these treatments. In contrast, comparing treatments xL to xR isolates a pure shipping e¤ect. Here we …nd that raising the shipping charge increases revenues, but the e¤ect is more pronounced when shipping costs are shrouded. 6 This revenue di¤erence is signi…cant at the 10% level under disclosure and the 5% level under shrouding. To summarize, changes in the reserve level do not appear to drive auction revenues.
Discussion
The main …ndings that emerge from the …eld experiments are: (1) shrouding a low shipping charge is a money-losing strategy; (2) raising shipping charges increases revenue, particularly when shrouded; and (3) these revenue di¤erences cannot be attributed to changes in the number of bidders. We sketch a model that can explain these …ndings. Suppose that the number of bidders is …xed. Some bidders are attentive-they are fully aware of the shipping charge. Others are naïve-they are unaware of the exact shipping charge, but believe it to be extremely low. 7 Finally, suspicious bidders are also unaware of the exact shipping charge, but assume that it will be high. 8 With disclosure, a fraction of the naïve and suspicious bidders become aware of the exact shipping charge and change their bids. Suspicious bidders raise their bids since the actual shipping charge is lower than their expectations, while naïve bidders lower their bids since the shipping charge is unexpectedly high. When the shipping charge is low, the net e¤ect of disclosure is to increase seller revenues since the gains from suspicious bidders outweigh the losses from naïve bidders. The reverse is true when the shipping charge is high. Thus, there is a shipping charge threshold below which disclosure is optimal and above which sellers prefer to shroud.
Increasing the shipping charge causes attentive bidders to reduce their bids on a onefor-one basis. Bids of naïve and suspicious bidders, who are unaware of the exact shipping charge, do not respond to this change. The net e¤ect is to improve seller revenues. When the shipping charge is shrouded, this improvement is larger than when the shipping charge is disclosed since a smaller fraction of bidders adjust their bids. 6 The revenue di¤erence between treatments SL and SR is consistent with the …ndings of Hossain and Morgan (2006) , who also found that revenues increased with higher shipping charges, holding the reserve …xed. Unlike their …ndings, we do not see a treatment di¤erence in the number of bidders. 7 Such behavior might arise if consumers anchor on the base price (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting a model along these lines.
Natural Experiment
On October 28, 2004, eBay US announced a change in their search format-prospective bidders would now have the option of seeing the shipping charge for each auction on the results page. Prior to this, users had to read the body of each auction listing to learn the shipping charge. EBay also increased the visibility of shipping charges by displaying them on the bid con…rmation screen. This action shifted the default from shrouding to disclosure of shipping charges.
We obtained a dataset used in Tyan (2005) consisting of successful auctions for gold and silver coins on eBay's US site from September to December 2004. In this dataset, we classify the shipping charges for each auction as either "shrouded"or "disclosed."Shipping charges are shrouded when they are not included in the title or search results and disclosed when they are included. Shrouded auctions are those ending prior to October 27, 2004, while disclosed auctions are those beginning after November 10, 2004. 9 Auctions between these dates are omitted. Table 3 summarizes the revenue (including shipping), opening price, shipping charge, and number of unique bidders for the shrouded and disclosed auctions. Interestingly, average revenues are higher when the shipping charge is disclosed than when it is shrouded. The increase, however, cannot be attributed to di¤erences in the number of bidders-shrouded auctions attract about the same number of bidders as do disclosed auctions. We study changes in shrouding and shipping charges using the following regression:
where X is a matrix of control variables. For the …eld experiment, we include product …xed e¤ects. For silver coins, we use a dummy for whether then coin was graded. For gold coins, we use dummies for each grade interacted with dummies for the grading organization. We also control for whether the coin was listed as a "proof" or "brilliant uncirculated." Controls for photographs, acceptance of Paypal or credit cards, and the decile of the sellers' feedback rating are used for all coin auctions. To account for heteroskedasticity, we use robust estimation. Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. If shrouding matters, then we should reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients associated with disclosure are all equal to zero ( 3 = 4 = 5 = 0). Table 4 reports that this is the case in all instances. 9 Results are robust to variations in these cuto¤ dates.
What happens when a seller increases the shipping charge but leaves the reserve level unchanged? If all bidders were attentive, this would have no e¤ect on revenues (under shrouding 1 = 2 ; under disclosure 1 + 4 = 2 + 5 ). When shipping charges are shrouded, we reject this hypothesis-a one dollar increase in shipping with an equal reduction in the opening price raises revenue. When shipping charges are disclosed, we can reject the null hypothesis for silver coins, but not for other items. In all cases, increasing shipping by a dollar while holding the reserve level constant has a smaller revenue e¤ect when the shipping charge is disclosed than when it is shrouded.
An average seller bene…ted from the increased disclosure of shipping charges due to eBay's format change. Formally, we reject the hypothesis that an average seller earned the same revenue under shrouding and disclosure ( 3 + 4 average opening price + 5 average shipping charge = 0; F (1;261) = 4:48 for gold coins and F (1;499) = 50:58 for silver coins).
Are di¤erences in the number of bidders driving the revenue e¤ects? To examine this, we change the dependent variable in equation (1) to the number of unique bidders. Table  5 presents the results of this analysis. We only observe a shrouding e¤ect on the number of bidders for silver coins. For all other data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the disclosure coe¢ cients are all equal to zero ( 3 = 4 = 5 = 0). Moreover, in every instance, shipping charge coe¢ cients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. There is little evidence that changes in the number of bidders are responsible for the observed revenue di¤erences.
Discussion
The regression results are consistent with those of the …eld experiments: (1) shrouding a¤ects revenues; (2) raising the shipping charge increases revenues, and the e¤ect is stronger under shrouding; and (3) these di¤erences are not attributable to changes in the number of bidders. The …nding that disclosure on eBay increased average seller revenues, however, presents a puzzle. If disclosure were pro…table, then why didn't more sellers disclose their shipping charges in the title of their listing?
Prior to the institutional change on eBay, an individual seller would not bene…t by switching from shrouding to disclosing a high shipping charge. Revenues would fall if more naïve bidders than suspicious ones became aware of the shipping charge, since newly-aware naïves would then lower their bids. In contrast, disclosure is pro…table for sellers o¤ering low shipping charges. A market-wide change is likely to have di¤erent e¤ects on awareness. In particular, suppose that suspicious bidders are more technologically sophisticated than naïve bidders and hence more likely to adjust their user preferences to make shipping visible following the changes to eBay's site. Now, if a seller discloses a high shipping charge, newly-aware suspicious bidders will raise their bids (so long as the charge is below their expectations), and revenues will increase. Similarly, sellers o¤ering a low shipping charge will also bene…t from disclosure. As a result, overall seller revenues can increase with such a change even when disclosure was previously unpro…table (for high shipping charge sellers).
Conclusion
While sellers often shroud their shipping charges in online auctions, our …ndings suggest that the pro…tability of this strategy depends on the size of the charge. In …eld experiments, we …nd that shrouding a low shipping charge actually reduces seller revenues, while shrouding a high shipping charge does not improve revenues relative to disclosure. Using …eld data from eBay, we …nd that an institutional change toward transparency may raise revenues for the average seller. Shrouding and partitioned pricing are complements-a seller can increase revenues by raising its shipping charge when shrouded, but not under disclosure. These revenue e¤ects are not attributable to changes in the number of bidders. Perhaps most surprising is the large revenue e¤ect of raising shipping charges under shrouding. Indeed, for all products, the estimated e¤ect of raising the shipping charge ( 1 in Table 1 ) is statistically indistinguishable from 1 at the 5% level. 10 That is, a dollar increase in shipping passes directly through to seller revenues. Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. "D" indicates disclosure, "S" indicates shrouded, "L" indicates low shipping fees and "H" indicates high shipping fees. "R" indicates Taiwan auctions with a high shipping fee and low opening price, designed to have a reserve equal to the reserve in treatment "L". Revenue is denoted in Euros. In March 2006, 1 TWD = 0.024 EUR. Permutation-based confidence intervals were constructed only when we failed to reject the null hypothesis of equality (200,000 replications 
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Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. For experimental data, "Disclosed"=1 when the shipping charge was listed in the item title. For field data, "Disclosed"=1 when the auction occurred after November 10, 2004 . IPod regressions includes item-specific fixed effects. Coin regressions included controls for condition, grade, seller reputation and other auction characteristics. Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. For experimental data, "Disclosed"=1 when the shipping charge was listed in the item title. For field data, "Disclosed"=1 when the auction occurred after November 10, 2004 . IPod regressions includes item-specific fixed effects. Coin regressions included controls for condition, grade, seller reputation and other auction characteristics.
Dependent variable: Number of Bidders

